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Abstract 
The boom-bust period of 1997-2003 is commonly viewed as an expectations-driven episode in which 
overly optimistic expectations about information and communications technology (ICT) were 
followed by their downward revision. Given that ICT is strongly related to technology in the broader 
producer and consumer durable goods sectors, this unique period can be used to identify news shocks 
about investment-specific technology (IST). Specifically, this paper proposes and implements novel 
identifying restrictions for identifying IST news shocks based on the notion that this period is arguably 
the most significant and apparent IST news-driven period in post-war data. In particular, I demonstrate 
via a variety of Vector Autoregression (VAR) models the robust result that the shock which i) has a 
long-run effect on the relative price of investment and ii) has its maximal sum of realizations, among 
all three-year period sums, in the 1997-1999 boom period followed by a negative sum in the bust 
period, is a shock that raises output, hours, investment, and consumption, and accounts for the 
majority of their business cycle variations. 
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1 Introduction
The 1997-2003 period was a significant boom-bust period in the U.S economy, which is com-
monly viewed as an episode driven by overly optimistic expectations about information and
communications technology (ICT) and the subsequent downward revision of these expecta-
tions (e.g., Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Dupor and Mekhari (2011)).1 Figure 1 depicts
some data that are indicative of this special episode. The figure shows the monthly Shiller’s
cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (henceforth: CAPE), defined as the ratio of the real
S&P 500 and the trailing 10 year real S&P 500 earnings, for the period of 1881:M1-2012:M6.
It is apparent that the 1997-1999 boom period was a period of extremely high CAPE ratios.
The beginning of 1997 marked the outset of unprecedented CAPE ratio levels in post-World
War II era terms, surpassing the very high levels that prevailed during the period of 2004-
2007. The remarkable rise of the CAPE ratio in the boom period culminated with an all-time
high value of 44.2 in December of 1999, from which point it started its bust phase reaching
a trough of 21.1 in February 2003.
The strong connection between ICT and technology in the broader sectors of durable
goods allows to exploit this special boom-bust episode to identify investment-specific tech-
nology (IST) news shocks.2 Specifically, I propose a novel identification approach that ex-
ploits this information on the 1997-2003 boom-bust period to identify IST news shocks by
imposing on the identified news shock series to i) have a long-run effect on the the relative
price of investment (RPI) and ii) have its maximal three-year moving sum in the 1997-1999
period followed by a negative sum in the bust period, whose absolute value is at least 25%
of the boom period sum.3 The restriction on the 1997:Q1-1999:Q4 sub-series imposes on
1See Appendix A in Karnizova (2012) for a list of several extracts from academic and government publica-
tions that link the boom and the recession to a downward revision of overly optimistic expectations regarding
ICT.
2The vast IST literature, which began with the pioneering work by Greenwood et al. (1988), focuses on
technology in the equipment and software investment and consumer durable goods sectors, of which ICT is
an important component. In particular, nominal expenditures on information and communication equipment
has accounted for roughly one half of the overall investment in equipment and software since the late 1990s.
3Specifically, in the presence of news shocks, the standard long-run restriction (e.g., Fisher (2006) and
Canova et al. (2010)) that posits that IST is the sole driver of RPI in the long run implies that two shocks
drive the long-run variation in RPI, one being the traditional unanticipated IST shock and the other being
the IST news shock, where the news shock has no effect on current IST but rather portends future changes
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the sum of shock realizations in the period 1997-1999 to be larger than any other three-year
period sums and manifests the view that this period is plausibly the most apparent IST
news-driven episode in post-war data. Moreover, the restriction on the 2000:Q1-2003:Q1
sub-series implies that at least a 25% correction of expectations took place in the bust pe-
riod. This seems a reasonable threshold given that essentially all of the stock market gains
in the boom period were lost in the bust period.4
I apply the identification strategy to a VAR that contains RPI, the real aggregates,
inflation, and interest rates, and find that the identified IST news shock raises output,
hours, investment, and consumption, and accounts for the majority of their business cycle
variations. Moreover, this shock raises interest rates, lowers inflation, and accounts for the
bulk of the long-run variation in output and RPI. These benchmark findings are shown to
be robust to various alterations and extensions of the baseline model, e.g., different sample
periods, alternative RPI measures, and estimating a variety of larger VAR’s that include
additional important macroeconomic variables such as stock prices, credit spreads, and total
factor productivity (TFP).
Authors such as Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Karnizova (2012) have emphasized the
view that the news shocks that took place in the late 1990s embodied expectations about
the future expected economy-wide gains from using the new and improved ICT. According
to this view, the late 1990s news shocks portended a future increase in measured TFP via
the use of better capital goods resulting from improved ICT. To check the validity of this
view, I add to the benchmark VAR the utilization-adjusted TFP measure constructed in
Fernald (2012) and apply my identification method to this extended VAR. The results from
this exercise indicate that the identified IST news shocks have a small effect on TFP at all
horizons, casting doubt on the relevance of the TFP news view of the late 1990s-early 2000s
period. Moreover, it’s important to note that this outcome is not driven by the presumption
that the IST news view of this period is valid. In particular, I also ran an exercise in
in it. Hence, as will be explained in the next section, I allow for an additional shock to have a long-run
effect on RPI by imposing on the long-run variation of RPI to be driven by two economic shocks, i.e., the
boom-bust shock identified as the IST news shock and the additional shock identified as the unanticipated
IST shock.
4The results of this paper are insensitive to imposing different correction thresholds.
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which the identified shock complied with the boom-bust restriction but was restricted to
be a non-IST shock, i.e., it was imposed upon to not be one of the two shocks that drive
the long-run variation in RPI, and found that only 14 models out of one million potentially
admissible models comply with this type of assumption and that the non-IST boom-bust
shock is unrelated to TFP at all horizons. That is, the result that the TFP news-view is not
supported by the data is independent of whether or not the IST news view is presumed. An
additional implication of this exercise is that the very small number of admissible models
indicates that the IST news view of the boom-bust period is in fact plausible, consistent
with common perception.
The results of this paper pose a challenge for future DSGE model builders to try to
construct models in which IST news shocks are not only capable of generating business
cycles but are also the main driver behind business cycle fluctuations. While the former
feature has been already obtained by papers such as Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and
Dupor and Mekhari (2011), the latter feature is much harder to generate in DSGE models.
In particular, in the estimated DSGE models of Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) and Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) IST news have a very limited role. Moreover, the results of this
paper indicate that IST news shocks imply a significant long-run increase in IST which
drives a significant permanent increase in the non-stationary real aggregates, i.e., output,
investment, and consumption. This result is consistent with the view taken in Greenwood
et al. (1997) that IST is an important driver of long-run growth. The novelty of this paper’s
results is that it is the news shock component of IST which is driving long-run growth, rather
than the unanticipated shock.
There are two main streams of literature to which my paper is linked. First, from a
methodological standpoint, the identification method I use in this paper is based on the
sign restrictions Structural VAR (SVAR) literature which identifies shocks of interest by
employing set identification whereby theory-consistent restrictions are imposed to generate
a set of theory-consistent models. This literature has mainly focused on imposing restric-
tions on the sign of impulse responses (Uhlig (2005), Dedola and Neri (2007), Mountford
and Uhlig (2009), Peersman and Straub (2009), and Kilian and Murphy (2012)) as well
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as the sign of the cross correlation function in response to shocks (Canova and De Nicolo
(2002)). My method is new with regard to the sign restrictions literature in two important
respects. First, it does not impose restrictions on the effects of the shocks but rather on the
shock realizations themselves. Second, it imposes restrictions on the long-run forecast error
variance decomposition of RPI. The long-run restriction ensures that only two shocks drive
the long-run variation in RPI, whereas the boom-bust restriction enables one to distinguish
between unanticipated and news shocks and to identify both shocks. The long-run restric-
tion can be considered a robust model-based restriction as, in most IST-driven models, the
long-run variation in RPI is entirely driven by IST. The boom-bust restriction, while not
being rooted in any macroeconomic model, is based on a real macroeconomic event and its
plausible interpretation, which is shared by various economists.
Second, my paper is related to the literature on IST news shocks. While Khan and
Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012)) identified these shocks via an esti-
mated DSGE model and found a negligible role for them in the business cycle, Ben Zeev and
Khan (2012) obtained results that are fairly similar to those found in this paper by applying
a very different identification approach based on the Barsky and Sims (2011) maximum fore-
cast error variance (MFEV) identification approach to news shocks. In particular, Ben Zeev
and Khan (2012) identified the IST news shock as the shock orthogonal to RPI and which
maximally explains future short-run and medium-run movements in RPI. While the Barsky
and Sims (2011) MFEV method requires observing the fundamental to which the news shock
pertains, exploiting the IST news-driven episode of the late 1990s and early 2000s enables
me to identify IST news shocks without assuming that IST is fully reflected by RPI and is
thus observable, as is the case in Ben Zeev and Khan (2012).5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the details of the
empirical strategy are laid out. Section 3 begins with a description of the data, after which
it presents the main empirical evidence followed by a sensitivity analysis section. Section
5The median correlation between this paper’s identified shocks and the Ben Zeev and Khan (2012) shock
series is 58%, a significant correlation though clearly one that manifests a noticeable wedge between the two
identified shock series. This wedge is to be expected given the fundamental difference between the types of
identification restrictions imposed in the two identification strategies.
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5 discusses the issue of how to interpret the identified news shocks on the basis of real-life
news events. The final section concludes.
2 Identification Method
Prior to presenting the identification method in detail, I will first explain the underlying
theoretical framework upon which the empirical analysis is based.
2.1 Underlying Framework
The general relation between RPI and IST can be illustrated by considering a two sector
model along the lines outlined in Justiniano et al. (2011) with separate imperfectly compet-
itive investment and consumption sectors. Both sectors are influenced by a common total
factor productivity (TFP) shock and, in addition, the investment sector is affected by an IST
shock. In this set up one can derive the following equilibrium equation linking IST progress
with the relative price of investment
ISTt =
(
ac
aI
)(
mcC,t
mcI,t
)(
KC,t
LC,t
)−(1−aC)(KI,t
LI,t
)(1−aI)(PI,t
PC,t
)−1
(1)
where aj stands for the capital share in sector j = C, I, mcj,t is real marginal cost (or
the inverse of the equilibrium markup) in sector j = C, I, Kj,t/Lj,t represents the capital-
labor ratio in sector j = C, I, and Υt corresponds to investment-specific technology. Many
one sector DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007)) can be viewed as equivalent
representations of a two sector model that admits identical production functions across the
two sectors, free sectoral factor reallocation, and perfectly competitive sectors. However,
recent research (i.e., Basu et al. (2010) and Justiniano et al. (2011)) has argued that the
assumption of equality between RPI and IST which is based on the latter three conditions
is too strong. It is clear from Equation (1) that if one of these three conditions is not met
there will be a wedge between RPI and IST. Hence, I only make the weak assumption that
IST is the sole source of the long-run variation in RPI.6 This is the underlying identifying
6For IST to be the sole source of the unit root in RPI there would need to be equal capital shares across
the investment and consumption sectors, free sectoral factor reallocation in the long run, and stationarity of
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assumption made by papers that aimed to identify unanticipated IST shocks (e.g., Fisher
(2006) and Canova et al. (2010)) whereby they conjectured that the only shock that has
a long-run effect on RPI is the unanticipated IST shock. Nevertheless, as opposed to just
assuming that one shock drives IST, I allow for the possibility that part of the variation in
IST is anticipated in advance.
IST is assumed to be well-characterized as following a stochastic process driven by two
shocks. The first is the traditional unanticipated IST shock, which impacts the level of
technology in the same period in which agents observe it. The second is the news shock,
which is differentiated from the first shock in that agents observe the news shock in advance
and it portends future changes in technology. The following is an example process that
incorporates both unanticipated and IST news shocks:7
t = t−1 + gt−j + ηt (2)
gt = κgt−1 + et (3)
Here IST, denoted by t, follows a unit root process where the drift term itself gt−j follows
an AR(1) process with j ≥ 1. j represents the anticipation lag, i.e., the delay between the
announcement of news and the period in which the future technological change is expected to
occur. Parameter 0 ≤ κ < 1 describes the persistence of the drift term. η is the conventional
unanticipated technology shock. Given the timing assumption, et has no immediate impact
on the level of IST but portends future changes in it. Hence, it can be defined as an IST
news shock.
sectoral mark-ups. The latter is implied by macroeconomic theory as standard sectoral phillips curves imply
that mark-ups are roughly the difference between expected inflation rates and current ones (e.g., Justiniano
et al. (2011)). Moreover, Basu et al. (2010) find that the capital share for the services and non-durables
sector is 0.36 whereas that of equipment and software investment and consumer durables is 0.31. Given that
the two shares are relatively close, and that it is reasonable to assume that in the long run factor inputs can
freely reallocate, it seems sensible to assume that the the long-run variation in RPI is driven by unanticipated
IST shocks and IST news shocks.
7A similar process was used by Leeper and Walker (2011), Leeper et al. (2012), and Barsky and Sims
(2011, 2012). The stochastic drift term gt is introduced so as to generate a smooth news process whereby
following the news shock technology will start to rise j periods into the future after which it will continue to
gradually and persistently increase until reaching some new higher steady state. If κ were to equal zero there
be would no gradual rise but rather a jump in technology j periods into the future after which technology
will remain at that higher level permanently.
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Given the above underlying theoretical framework, I will only consider models that are
consistent with Equation (1). In particular, I will impose the restriction that at least 90%
of the long-run variation in RPI is driven by two shocks. Ideally, one would want to require
that 100% of the long-run variation in RPI is driven by two shocks but given that there
could be measurement errors present in my empirical analysis and that the capital shares
in the consumption and investment sectors seem to be close but not entirely identical, the
90% restriction seems a reasonable compromise. I will now turn to explaining the empirical
strategy employed in the paper.
2.2 Generating the Set of Admissible Models
My methodology is a set identification VAR-based method which generates the set of models
that comply with a defined set of restrictions, to be described below in detail. The method
is a set identification one because the imposed restrictions admit a system of inequalities
that in general will have either no solutions or a set of solutions. As will be explained below,
this set of solutions will constitutes the set of models that satisfy my imposed restrictions.
I employ Bayesian estimation and inference and therefore the set of admissible models will
also account for parameter uncertainty. My benchmark empirical VAR consists of the real
aggregates, RPI, inflation, and interest rates.
Specifically, Let yt be a kx1 vector of observables of length T and let the VAR in the
observables be given as
yt = B1yt−1 +B2yt−2 + ...+Bpyt−p +Bc + ut (4)
where Bi are matrices of size kxk, p denotes the number of lags, Bc is a kx1 vector of
constants, and ut ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Σ) is the kx1 vector of reduced-form innovations where Σ is
the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form innovations. Without loss of generalization,
it is assumed that technology constitutes the first variable in system. For future reference,
let the (kp + 1)xk B = [B1, ..., Bp, Bc]
′ matrix represent the reduced form VAR coefficient
matrix. Hence, the reduced form VAR parameters can be summarized by the coefficient
matrix B and variance covariance matrix Σ.
7
It is assumed that there exists a linear mapping between the reduced-form innovations
and economic shocks, et, given as
ut = Aet (5)
The impact matrix A must satisfy AA′ = Σ. There are, however, an infinite number of
impact matrices that solve the system. In particular, for some arbitrary orthogonalization,
C (e.g the cholesky factor of Σ), the entire space of permissible impact matrices can be
written as CD, where D is a k x k orthonormal matrix (D′ = D−1 and DD′ = I, where I is
the identity matrix).8
Given an estimated reduced form VAR, standard SVAR methods would try to deliver
point identification of at least one of the columns of A whereas set identification methods
would generate the set of admissible models. In the set identification approach the aim is
to draw a large number of random orthonormal matrices D in order to generate a large
set of models from which the set of admissible models can be obtained by checking which
models comply with the imposed restrictions. I follow the conventional Bayesian approach
to estimation and inference taken by the sign restrictions literature (e.g., Uhlig (2005),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Peersman and Straub (2009), and Kilian and Murphy (2012))
by jointly drawing from the posterior distribution of the reduced form VAR parameters,
summarized by matrices B and Σ, and identification matrices D under the assumption of a
normal-inverse Wishart prior distribution for the reduced-form VAR parameters and a Haar
distribution for the identification matrix. As shown by Uhlig (1994), the normal-inverse
Wishart prior coupled with the assumption of a Gaussian likelihood for the data sample
imply a posterior density of the reduced-form VAR parameters that is also distributed as a
normal-inverse Wishart.9 The procedure for randomly drawing models can be described as
follows:
8 In consistence with the SVAR literature, I assume here that the number of economic shocks is equal to
the number of observables. The results are not changed if a larger number of shocks is assumed. Nevertheless,
computational time is reduced significantly with a smaller number of shocks and thus this assumption is
maintained.
9Specifically, I assume a standard diffuse prior on the VAR reduced form parameters B and Σ. Moreover,
note that because D does not appear in the likelihood function its prior and posterior distributions are the
same, both being represented by the Haar distribution.
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1. Randomly draw a kxk matrix P of NID(0,1) random variables. Derive the QR decom-
position of P such that P = QR and QQ′ = I and let D=Q.
2. Randomly draw from the posterior distribution of reduced form VAR parameters
p(B,Σ | data). Compute the cholesky factor of the drawn Σ and denote it by C.
3. Use orthonormal matrix D, cholesky factor matrix C, and coefficient matrix B to
compute impulse responses and economic shocks via the orthogonalization A = CD.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 1,000,000 times.
Steps 1 and 2 are needed to draw the identification matrix D and reduced form VAR param-
eters B and Σ, respectively. Appendix A describes the details of how the posterior simulator
for the reduced form VAR parameters is implemented. As discussed by Rubio-Ramirez et al.
(2010), Step 1 constitutes an efficient method for generating orthonormal matrices. Step 3
involves using the drawn matrices from the previous three steps and the orthogonalization
A = CD for the computation of the impulse responses and economic shocks, computed as
et = A
−1ut,. Steps 1-3 essentially deliver a matrix triplet (B,Σ,D) which represents a model
as this matrix triplet is all that is needed for knowing the corresponding model in terms of
impulse responses, forecast error variance decomposition, and series of economic shocks. I
generate 1,000,000 such matrix triplets, or models, in accordance with Steps 1-3 from which
only the admissible models will be chosen so as to constitute the desired set of models that
are compliant with my restrictions. In practice, it is checked if the resulting models comply
with the following restrictions:
1. One shock, belonging to the vector of economic shocks et, has its maximal three-year
moving sum in the 1997-1999 period followed by a negative sum in the bust period of
2000:Q1-2003:Q1, whose absolute value is at least 25% of the boom period sum.10
10To be clear, the maximum is computed with respect to all of the three-year sub-series within the same
shock series. Hence, this restriction implies that the sum of realizations in the 1997-1999 period is larger
than the sum of realizations in all other three-year periods present in the shock series. Given a shock series
of size T-p, where T is the sample size for the observed variables and p is the number of lags in the VAR,
this maximum restriction essentially implies a total of T − p− 11 inequality restrictions on the shock series.
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2. At least 90% of the long-run variation in RPI is driven by the shock from the first
restriction and an additional arbitrary shock belonging to et.
11
The chosen boom and bust periods are generally consistent with the boom and bust behavior
of both the stock market as well as the real economy. The boom restriction essentially
requires that the largest realizations of IST news shocks take place in the boom period, in
accordance with the common view that the boom period is the most apparent IST news-
driven period in post-war data. Note that the choice of the starting and ending periods of
the boom period is consistent with the fact that in the beginning of this period the stock
market, as measured by Shiller’s CAPE ratio, started to reach unprecedented levels in post-
war era terms after which it rose continuously until peaking at the end of the period. The
bust restriction requires that at least a 25% correction of the overly optimistic expectations
of the late 1990s takes place in the early 2000’s. This seems a reasonable threshold given
that essentially all of the stock market gains in the boom period were lost in the bust period.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section the main results of the paper are presented. For the benchmark results I es-
timate a VAR with seven variables: RPI, output, hours, consumption, investment, inflation,
and interest rates. Before proceeding, a brief discussion of the data is given. Then, the main
empirical results are presented in detail.
3.1 Data
RPI is measured in the standard way as a quality adjusted investment deflator divided by
a consumption deflator (e.g., Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000), Fisher (2006), Canova et al.
(2010), Beaudry and Lucke (2010), and Liu et al. (2011)). The consumption deflator corre-
sponds to nondurable and service consumption, derived directly from the National Income
11To ensure that the identified shock is not a measurement error or some other economic shock that also
experienced large realization in the boom period (e.g., noise shocks), I also imposed on the identified shock
to explain at least 5% of the long-run variation in RPI. Nevertheless, this had a negligible effect on the
results as in only one percent of the admissible models did the identified shock explain less than 5% of the
long-run variation in RPI.
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and Product Accounts (NIPA). The quality adjusted investment deflator corresponds to
equipment and software investment and durable consumption and is based on the Gordon
(1990) price series for producer durable equipment (henceforth the GCV deflator), as later
updated by Cummins and Violante (2002), so as to better account for quality changes. More
recently, Liu et al. (2011) used an updated GCV series constructed by Patrick Higgins at the
Atlanta Fed that spans the period 1959:Q1:2012:Q1. I use this updated series as a measure
for IST.12
The nominal series for output, consumption, and investment, data are taken from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Output is measured as GDP in the non-farm busi-
ness sector, consumption as the sum of non-durables and services, and investment is the
sum of personal consumption expenditures on durables and gross private domestic invest-
ment. The nominal series are converted to per capita terms by dividing by the civilian non-
institutionalized population aged sixteen and over. I use the corresponding chain-weighted
deflators to obtain the real series. The hours series is log of total hours worked in the
non-farm business sector. Inflation is measured as the percentage change in the CPI for all
urban consumers, and interest rate, the nominal interest rate is the three month Treasury
Bill rate.13 My benchmark data series span the period 1959:Q1-2012:Q1.
3.2 Impulse Responses and Forecast Error Variance Decomposi-
tion
I apply my identification method on a VAR that includes seven variables: RPI, output,
investment and durables, non-durables and services consumption, the log of total hours
worked, CPI inflation, and interest rates. Apart from hours, inflation, and interest rates,
which are assumed to be stationary and enter the system in levels, all other variables enter the
system in their first differences. The Akaike information criterion favors three lags whereas
12I thank Patrick Higgins at the Atlanta Fed for providing me with this series. The reader is referred to
the appendix in Liu et al. (2011) for a description of the methods used to construct the series. In the next
section which deals with robustness analysis, I confirm that the results are robust to using an RPI measure
obtained directly from NIPA investment deflators.
13To convert monthly population, inflation, and interest rate series to quarterly series, I use the last
monthly observation from each quarter.
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the Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria favor one and two lags, respectively.
As a benchmark, I choose to estimate a VAR with three lags. The results are robust to using
a different number of lags. 1,000,000 models are generated via the procedure described by
Steps 1-4. I then check whether the identifying assumption holds for each model and keep
only the admissible models. The set of admissible models consists of 1635 models.
Figures 2a and 2b show the posterior distribution of impact impulse responses and con-
tribution to forecast error variance (FEV) of the variables of the IST news shock at the two
year horizon, respectively. Moreover, Figures 3a and 3b depict the median and 90th and 10th
percentiles of the posterior distributions of impulse responses and contribution to forecast
error variance at all horizons up to the 10 year one, respectively. In these figures, as well as
all of the next figures, it was ensured that the identified IST news shock is a favorable shock
by multiplying the impulse responses by -1 if the long-run effect of the shock on RPI was
positive.
It is apparent from these four figures that favorable IST news shocks raise the real
aggregates (output, hours, investment, and consumption) on impact and drive the bulk
of their business cycle variations.14 The median impact effects are 0.42%, 0.28%, 1.47%,
and 0.28%, respectively. All of the latter effects are economically significant and point to
the strong business cycle comovement that the IST news shock generates. The median
contributions of IST news shocks to output, hours, investment and consumption at the two
year horizon are 64%, 65%, 60%, and 60%, respectively, all indicating that IST news shocks
are the main force behind the business cycle. Moreover, the median contributions to the
long-run variation of output, consumption, and RPI are 52%, 50%, and 78%, respectively,
whereas that for investment is only 20%.15 These long-run contributions indicate that IST
14It should be noted that the unanticipated IST shock, identified as the other shock which drives the
long-run variation in RPI, has a positive median effect on output, hours, and investment, a negative effect
on inflation, and negligible effects on consumption and interest rates. Moreover, the shock has a small
contribution to the business cycle variation of the real aggregates with median contributions to the two year
variation in output, hours, investment, and consumption at 6%, 8%, 6%, and 4%, respectively. These results
are available upon request from the author.
15Note that these estimates are not shown in Figures 3a and 3b as the latter figures pertain to only the first
10 years following the shock whereas the long-run estimates are computed from the permanent responses of
the non-stationary variables.
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news shocks have more of a hump-shaped effect on investment compared to output and
consumption. Moreover, while IST news shocks don’t account for much of the business cycle
variation in RPI, they explain the bulk of the long-run variation in RPI.
3.3 Time Series of Identified Shocks
Figure 4 shows the median IST news shock series from the benchmark VAR. To make the
figure more readable, I show the one year trailing moving average of the median shock series
as opposed to the actual series.16 The shaded areas represent recession dates as defined by
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). As the series starts in 1960:Q4, only
the two last quarters of the 1960:Q2-1961:Q1 recession are included in the figure.
In accordance with the boom-bust restriction, there are significant positive realizations in
the late 1990s followed by a series of negative realizations in the early 2000’s and in particular
in the 2001 recession. Moreover, significant negative IST news shocks are associated with
all other seven U.S recessions included in the sample period. The evidence from Figure 4 is
consistent with the results from the previous section which indicate that IST news shocks
are a major driver of U.S business cycles.
4 Robustness
This section addresses seven potentially important issues regarding the analysis undertaken
in the previous section. The first is the concern that there may not exist a perfect linear
mapping between VAR innovations and economic shocks. The second is the concern that over
the entire sample period VAR innovations may not be homoscedastic and VAR coefficients
may not be stable. The third issue pertains to the possibility that hours are not necessarily
stationary and thus should perhaps enter the system in first differences rather than in levels.
The fourth issue concerns the argument put forward recently by Justiniano et al. (2011) which
asserts that there may be a relation between IST and credit market disturbances. The fifth
issue concerns the notion that the news shocks that drove the boom-bust period portended
16The smooth shock series was derived by first computing the median of the 1635 identified IST news
shock series and then calculating the one year moving average series from the median shock series.
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a future increase in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) via the use of improved capital goods
(e.g., Beaudry and Portier (2004)). The sixth potential concern is the robustness of the
results to using alternative measures of RPI. Lastly, I also confirm that the results of this
paper are not driven by other structural disturbances identified in the literature.17
4.1 Addressing Potential Invertibility Issues
Leeper et al. (2012) and Sims (2012) have highlighted that the presence of news shocks about
future fundamentals can pose difficulties for an econometrician drawing inference based on
identified VARs. Specifically, news shocks also constitute unobserved state variables and can
therefore drive a wedge between VAR innovations and economic shocks if the observables
are not capable of perfectly forecasting them. From a practical standpoint, one approach to
addressing this is to improve the econometrician’s information set so that it is better aligned
with those of the private agents in the economy. Using Monte Carlo evidence, Sims (2012)
shows that this approach can either ameliorate or eliminate the invertibility problem. While
the benchmark VAR does include the main macroeconomic variables, both real and nominal,
it still may be the case that more information needs to be added in order to attain better
identification. Towards this end, I add a measure of stock prices (Beaudry and Portier (2006))
to the benchmark VAR as it is reasonable to assume that stock prices contain information
about future IST progress.18
Figures 5a and 5b correspond to Figures 3a and 3b with the only difference being that now
the benchmark VAR is replaced by a larger VAR that includes stock prices.19 The figures
are based on 1,000,000 randomly generated models from which a total of 181 admissible
models were collected. Similar to the benchmark case (Figures 3a and 3b), favorable IST
news shocks raise the real aggregates on impact and drive the bulk of their business cycle
17I have also confirmed the robustness of the results to different lag specifications in the VAR. These
results are available upon request from the author.
18The measure of stock prices used is the log of the real S&P 500 Index, obtained from Robert Shiller’s
website, in per capita terms. This series is converted to a quarterly frequency by taking the last monthly
observation from each quarter. The results remain unchanged if the stock prices are not in per capita terms.
19In the interest of space, the histograms figures that correspond to Figures 3a and 3b will not be presented
in the robustness section. These figures are available upon request from the author.
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variation. The news shocks also continue to raise interest rates and reduce inflation.
Interestingly, IST news shocks are also important drivers of the variation in stock prices,
confirming the view that the latter information variables contain valuable information about
the future value of IST. Specifically, the median contribution of IST news shocks to output,
hours, investment, and consumption are 56%, 52%, 51%, and 55%, respectively, while that
to the variation in stock prices is 36%. Moreover, all of the latter variables jump on impact
following the news shock. That the median impact effects of IST news on stock prices is so
significant at 4.3% is an indication that stock prices contain important information about
the future value of IST.
4.2 Results for a Post 1982 Sub Sample
One may be concerned that the VAR coefficients may not be stable over the entire sample
period. Moreover, the VAR innovations may not be homoskedastic. Hence, in this section
results from applying my methodology on a post 1982 sub-sample will be presented where it
will be demonstrated that the sub-sample results, which are much less likely to suffer from
potential heteroskedasticity and coefficient instability (e.g., Stock and Watson (2007)), are
essentially the same as the large sample results.
Figures 6a and 6b correspond to Figures 3a and 3b with the only difference being that
the former figures were based on a post 1982 sub sample (1983Q1-2012Q1). The figures are
based on 1,000,000 randomly generated models from which a total of 445 admissible models
were gathered. It is apparent the main results are unchanged for the sub sample period as
IST news shocks drive the bulk of the business cycle variations in the real aggregates as well
as the long-run variation in RPI. Moreover, IST news shocks continue to generate business
cycle comovement, raise interest rates, and lower inflation. The median contributions of
IST news shocks to output, hours, investment, and consumption at the two year horizon are
68%, 57%, 58%, and 64%, respectively. Moreover, the median contribution to the long-run
variation in RPI is 71% emphasizing the importance of IST news shocks as drivers of not
only the business cycle variation of the real aggregates but also the long-run movement in
RPI.
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4.3 Non-Stationarity of Hours
The results of the previous section were obtained from a VAR in which hours were assumed
to be stationary and thus entered the system in levels form. To test the robustness of the
results to this assumption, I implemented the same identification procedure on a VAR in
which hours are assumed to be non-stationary and thus enter the system in first difference
form.
Figures 7a and 7b correspond to Figures 3a and 3b with the only difference being that
the former are obtained from a VAR in which hours are assumed to be non-stationary and
thus enter the system in first difference form. The figures are based on 1,000,000 randomly
generated models from which a total of 291 admissible models were gathered. It is apparent
from the figures that the results of this paper are generally robust to the way that hours
enter the system. It is apparent that IST news shocks continue to generate business cycle
comovement as the real aggregates all rise significantly on impact in response to the news
shock. The positive response of interest rates as well as the negative response of inflation
are also maintained. Moreover, IST news shocks continue to drive a major share of the
business cycle variation in the real aggregates with a 52% median contribution to output
and consumption variation and a 43% contribution to investment and hours variation.
As Figure 7a illustrates, the response of hours to the IST news shock is permanent. While
the assumption that hours are non-stationarity cannot be entirely ruled out on theoretical
grounds, it is still hard to justify such a permanent response based on macroeconomic theory.
Hence, imposing a first difference form on hours may seem to be too restrictive. Nevertheless,
the results from this section show that in general the main features of the results remain
unchanged and are quite robust to the specification of hours in the VAR.
4.4 Relation between News Shocks and Credit Spreads
Recent work by Justiniano et al. (2011) has argued that there is a close relation between
shocks to IST and shocks to financial intermediation as financial intermediation can poten-
tially affect the production of capital goods. Justiniano et al. (2011) demonstrated that
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the IST shock estimated from their structural model has a strong correlation with credit
spreads.20 In order to try to asses the relation between my identified news shocks and credit
spreads, I applied the identification procedure on a VAR that includes the spread between
the expected return on medium-grade bonds and high-grade bonds (Moody’s seasoned Baa
corporate bond yield and Aaa corporate bond yield, respectively).
Figures 8a and 8b correspond to Figures 3a and 3b with the only difference being that the
former are obtained from a VAR in which the credit spread variable is included. The figures
are based on 1,000,000 randomly generated models from which a total of 789 admissible
models were gathered. It is apparent from the figures that the results remain unchanged
with respect to the benchmark results. IST news shocks continue to generate business cycle
comovement, raise interest rates, lower inflation, and to drive the majority of the business
cycle variations of the real aggregates (a median share of 59%, 62%, 53%, 55% of the two
year variation in output, hours, investment, and consumption, respectively).
As for the implications for the credit spread variable, it is apparent that a financial
accelerator mechanism is present following the news shock; the spread follows a hump shaped
response, barely moving on impact and then starting to decline while peaking after 5 quarters.
Moreover, the median contribution of the news shock to the two year variation in the spread
is 13% while it explains less than 3% of its impact variation. The negligible impact median
response of the spread is consistent with the very low median correlation of 9% between the
identified news shocks and the VAR innovation the spread. Given that the latter can be
viewed as a shocks to the functioning of credit markets, this low correlation can seen as an
indication that the results of this paper are not driven by credit supply disturbances.
4.5 Relation between News Shocks and TFP
Authors such as Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Karnizova (2012) view the news shocks
that took place in the late 1990s as being strongly related to the expectations about the
20Specifically, the estimated shock from Justiniano et al. (2011) represented a shock to the transformation
of investment goods to capital goods, rather than the transformation of consumption goods into capital
goods. While the latter usually represents IST shocks in DSGE models, the former can also be viewed as a
shock to the technology with which capital goods are produced and thus as a shock to IST.
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future expected gains from using the new and improved IT goods. This view implies that
the late 1990s news shocks portended a future increase in measured TFP and can therefore
be interpreted as TFP news shocks. To examine whether such an interpretation is plausible,
I applied my identification procedure on a VAR that includes a measure of TFP. 21
Figures 9a and 9b correspond to Figures 3a and 3b with the only difference being that
the former are obtained from a VAR in which TFP is included. The figures are based on
1,000,000 randomly generated models from which a total of 495 admissible models were
gathered. It is apparent from the figures that the results remain unchanged with respect to
the benchmark results and that the identified IST news shocks have a small and insignificant
median effect on TFP at all horizons. This result implies that the IST news shocks identified
in this paper are not related to TFP news shocks, thus suggesting that the TFP news-view
of this period is misguided.22
One potential concern that can still arise is that the TFP news view of the boom-bust
period is being rejected as a result of the presumption that the IST news view of this period
is correct. To address this issue, I imposed on the identified shock to be a non-IST shock, i.e.,
I only considered models in which the shock which complies with the boom-bust restriction
is not one of the two shocks that drive the long-run variation in RPI. The results from this
exercise are presented in Figures 10a and 10b, which present the impulse responses and
FEV contributions for the identified non-IST shock, respectively.23 The figures are based
on 1,000,000 randomly generated models from which a total of 14 admissible models were
collected.
The results of this exercise deliver a conclusive message: the non-IST boom-bust shock
has a small and insignificant effect on TFP at all horizons. This outcome emphasizes that
the improbability of the TFP news view of the boom-bust period is robust to the assumption
21For the TFP series, I employ the real-time, quarterly series on total factor productivity (TFP) for
the U.S. business sector, adjusted for variations in factor utilization (labor effort and capital’s workweek),
constructed by Fernald (2012).
22More generally, this result suggests that the identified IST news shocks are not related to any type of
TFP shock, be it anticipated or unanticipated TFP shocks.
23Note that I am not identifying a structural shock here, but rather am letting the data speak as to the
plausibility of a TFP news view of the boom-bust period. Specifically, if the non-IST shock is strongly
related to TFP in a delayed manner this would suggest that the TFP news view is supported by the data.
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that the IST news view of this period is valid. Moreover, that such a small number of models
complies with the assumption that the boom-bust shock is a non-IST shock is an indication
that the IST news view of the boom-bust period is indeed plausible, which is in accordance
with what common perception dictates.
4.6 Alternative RPI Measure
While the GCV investment deflators are usually preferred to NIPA investment deflators as
measures of RPI in the literature, it still seems worthwhile to check the robustness of my
results to using the NIPA investment deflators for the RPI measure.24 Figures 11a and 11b
correspond to Figures 3a and 3b with the only difference being that the former are obtained
from a VAR in which RPI is measured by the NIPA investment deflators rather than the
GCV deflators. The figures are based on 1,000,000 randomly generated models from which
a total of 891 admissible models were collected.
It is apparent from the figures that the results remain unchanged with respect to the
benchmark results. IST news shocks continue to generate business cycle comovement, raise
interest rates, lower inflation, and to drive the majority of the business cycle variations of
the real aggregates (a median share of 63%, 66%, 60%, and 56% of the two year variations
in output, hours, investment, and consumption, respectively. Moreover, the bulk of the
long-run variation in RPI is accounted for by the news shock with a median contribution of
73%.
4.7 Cross-Correlation with Other Structural Disturbances
An additional concern that may arise from the benchmark results is that the identified
IST news shock is correlated with other structural disturbances. To address this concern, I
computed the correlation between the identified IST news shock and up to four lags and leads
of the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shock measure, Romer and Romer (2010)
tax shock measure, shock to the real price of oil, the Ramey (2011) government spending
24I also verified that the results are unchanged when the output deflator is used instead of the consumption
deflator.
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news shock measure, the TFP news shock from Barsky and Sims (2011), and the shock to
the uncertainty measure used in Bloom (2009) which is based on stock market volatility
and corresponds to Figure 1 in his paper. Apart from the Barsky and Sims (2011) TFP
news shock series which was used in its raw form, all other shocks were constructed as the
residuals of univariate regressions of each of the four variables on four lags.
The results are presented in Figure 12 where the median and 10th and 90th percentiles
of the correlation between the IST news shocks and up to four lags and leads of each of the
other five disturbances are shown. The results indicate that the cross-correlations are small,
with the median correlation never exceeding 17% in absolute value. Thus, it can be deduced
that the main results of the paper are not driven by other structural disturbances.
5 Discussion
A better understanding of business cycles naturally requires a better knowledge of their
sources. This paper has contributed to this understanding by providing robust evidence that
IST news shocks constitute the major source of business cycles. Nevertheless, a consumer
of these results might rightly argue that more information is needed on the nature of these
news shocks, and more specifically, what real-life events they represent and originate from.
This type of information can assist in improved understanding of economic fluctuations, e.g.,
by allowing us to detect the potential beginning of an expansionary cycle given some large
technological news event that is taking place.
In general, technology news shocks are unobserved and are thus hard to link to particular
corresponding news events. While Ramey (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2012) were able to
use the narrative approach to construct series of defense spending and tax news shocks, re-
spectively, an analogues narrative approach to technology news shocks is very hard to apply
for three main reasons. First, it is difficult to quantify anticipated technological innovations
given the general lack of quantitative information on their expected gains. Second, determin-
ing the exact timing of the arrival of information into economic agents’ information sets is
very hard to do. Last, but not least, it is an intricate task to handle negative news shocks as
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these are likely to correspond to downward revisions of expectations that are probably hard
to attach to real-life news events. It is thus not surprising that the technology news shocks
literature has not applied the narrative approach to identifying news shocks. However, it is
still possible to shed some light on the nature of the news shocks identified in this paper by
focusing on the unique late 1990s period.
In particular, I focus on the semiconductor industry given its pivotal technological role
as a driver of ICT.25 According to Constable and Somerville (2003), two of the greatest
technological innovations in the field of electronics in the 20th century, out of twenty overall,
are the inventions of copper-based chip technology and plastic transistor technology, both
of which are related to semiconductor manufacturing techniques and were announced in the
late 1990s boom period.26 The former invention was announced by IBM in September 1997
whereas the latter one was announced in March 1998 by a team of Bell Labs researchers.
Both inventions experienced a delay between their introduction date and adoption date, as
copper-based chips were commercially available only in September 1998, a year after the
initial announcement, while plastic transistors began to be commercially available in April
2002, i.e., with a much longer delay of four years.
Hence, these two breakthrough innovations constitute prominent examples of technolog-
ical innovations that were anticipated in advance. By no means are they exceptional in
this regard: my historical reading of other semiconductor innovations indicates that quite
often these kinds of technological innovations are well anticipated in advance as information
on them usually arrives prior to their commercial adoption. Moreover, information on the
expected future time of commercial adoption is usually available. Interestingly, two of the
three largest median realizations of my identified IST news shocks series in the 1997-1999
period took place in the third quarter of 1997 and first quarter of 1998, with the former
25See, for example, Aizcorbe et al. (2007) and references therein.
26This book is based on a comprehensive study conducted by the National Academy of Engineering
(NAE), in collaboration with the American Association of Engineering Societies and National Engineers
Week, aimed at determining the greatest engineering achievements in the 20th century in twenty different
fields. The selection process was based on solicited nominations from members of 60 professional engineering
societies from which the final greatest innovations were selected by an NAE committee consisting of renowned
experts, where the chief criterion for nominations was the impact of the engineering achievement on quality
of life.
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being the largest realization reaching 1.6 standard deviations and the latter being the third
largest realization at 1.22 standard deviations. The correspondence between the large rel-
ative magnitude of the identified news shocks and the timing of the announcements of the
inventions is an indication that, at least to some extent, these large news shocks represent
the significant news events triggered by the two inventions.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided robust evidence that IST news shocks are the main force behind
business cycle fluctuations, are deflationary, and raise nominal interest rates. To obtain
these results, I applied a novel identification approach that exploits the view that the late
1990s early 2000s boom-bust period can be characterized as an IST news-driven episode and
identified an IST news shock as the shock that i) has a long-run effect on RPI and ii) has its
maximal sum of realizations, among all three-year period sums, in the boom period followed
by a negative sum in the bust period.
The results of this paper on the business cycle implications of IST news shocks, at least
in terms of the ability of the latter shocks to generate business cycle comovement, can be
explained by modern macroeconomic theory. An IST news-driven DSGE model that con-
tains the Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preference structure, investment adjustment costs,
endogenous capital utilization can account for the empirical the impulse responses obtained
in the paper. Nevertheless, these impulse results are not robust to different parameteriza-
tions as employing the calibration used in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) generates business
cycle driving IST news shocks while using the estimated parameters obtained in Khan and
Tsoukalas (2011) does not deliver similar impulse responses.
Hence, it may be suitable to consider developing more robust models along the lines
of the recent paper by Dupor and Mekhari (2011) in which investment in the economy is
forward-compatible in the sense that it rises in response to IST news so that by the time the
technology arrives the complementary capital is already in place. This kind of mechanism is
appealing as it is consistent with what we observed during the late 1990s when investment
22
surged in anticipation of ICT improvement. One prominent example of this mechanism, as
noted by Dupor and Mekhari (2011), is the considerable rise in investment in fiber optic
cables in the late 1990s in anticipation of future ICT improvements. This mechanism is also
in agreement with the results of this paper as identified favorable IST news shocks generate
a significant contemporaneous expansion in investment.
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Appendix A Posterior Distribution of Reduced Form
VAR Parameters
The VAR given by (4) can be written in matrix notation as follows:
Y = XB + U (6)
where Y = [y1, ..., yT ]
′, X = [X1, ..., XT ]′, Xt = [yt−1, ..., yt−p, 1]′, B = [B1, ..., Bp, Bc]′,
k and p are the number of variables and lags, respectively, and U = [u1, ..., uT ]
′. B here
represents the reduced form VAR coefficient matrix and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix
of the reduced form VAR innovations. I follow the conventional approach of specifying a
normal-inverse Wishart prior distribution for the reduced-form VAR parameters:
vec(B) | Σ ∼ N(vec(B¯0),Σ⊗N−10 ) (7)
Σ ∼ IWk(v0S0, v0) (8)
where N0 is a kpxkp positive definite matrix, S0 is a kxk covariance matrix, and vo > 0. As
shown by Uhlig (1994), the latter prior implies the following posterior distribution:
vec(B) | Σ ∼ N(vec(B¯T ),Σ⊗N−1T ) (9)
Σ ∼ IWk(vTST , vT ) (10)
where vT = T + v0, NT = N0 +X
′X, B¯T = N−1T (N0B¯0 +X
′XBˆ),
ST =
v0
vT
S0 +
T
vT
Σˆ + 1
vT
(Bˆ − B¯0)′N0N−1T X ′X(Bˆ − B¯0), Bˆ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y ,
and Σˆ = (Y −XBˆ)′(Y −XBˆ)/T .
I follow the sign restrictions literature and use a weak prior, i.e., v0 = 0, N0 = 0, and
arbitrary S0 and B¯0. This implies that the prior distribution is proportional to |Σ|−(k+1)/2
and that vT = T, ST = Σˆ, B¯T = Bˆ, and NT = X
′X. Thus, the posterior simulator for B
and Σ can be described as follows:
1. Draw Σ from an IWk(T Σˆ, T ) distribution.
2. Draw B from the conditional distribution MN(Bˆ,Σ⊗ (X ′X)−1).
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 a large number of times and collect the drawn B’s and Σ’s.
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Figure 1: Shiller’s Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings Ratio.
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Notes : The figure shows the monthly Shiller’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio, defined
as the ratio of the real S&P 500 and the trailing 10 year real S&P 500 earnings, for the period
of 1881:M1-2012:M6.
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Figure 4: Identified IST news shock time series (smoothed) and U.S. recessions.
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Notes : The U.S. recessions are represented by the shaded areas. To render the figure more
readable, the plotted median identified shock series is smoothed using a one year moving
average. Specifically, it is calculated as εst = (εt−3 + εt−2 + εt−1 + εt)/4, where εt is the
median of the 1635 identified shock series. The plotted series begins in 1960:Q4 and ends in
2012:Q1.
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Figure 12: The Median and 90th and 10th Percentiles of the Cross-Correlation
between the IST News Shock and Lags/Leads of Other Shocks.
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Notes : The solid line is the median cross-correlation and the dashed lines are the 90th and
10th percentiles of the posterior distribution of cross-correlations.
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